Innate Morality & Godlessness

11 responses to “Innate Morality & Godlessness”

1. Aaron Argyropoulos

   December 31, 2013

   One idea I focus on often is the concept of absolutes, and it’s definitely worth discussing when it concerns innate morality. For argument’s sake, I will only consider Arminianism and Calvinism, which both rely heavily on how one views absolutes. First, depending on where an individual is on the Arminian spectrum, absolutes can be anywhere between important to practically meaningless. I’m aware Rob Bell is one my favorite topics to discuss, but throughout his books, he constantly questions and deconstructs beliefs that would constitute a lack of absolutes. Essentially, everything is questionable and unknowable to some extent, thus absolutes are seemingly unimportant (as a disclaimer, I am only using him as an example against absolutes because he simply shouldn’t be considered an authority for innate morality). Open Theists tend to take this a bit further by questioning the omni’s of God. Classic Arminians are more partial to accepting the absolutes of God’s attributes rather than questioning them. While they aren’t the same, Calvinism and Arminianism kind of blur here.

   From the Calvinist perspective, absolutes range anywhere between important to absolutes are everything. But even beyond that, it seems that the world of the Calvinist is much more black and white and tends toward the end of ‘absolutes are everything’ anyway, with little compromise towards the other end.

   So, from the Arminian perspective, they can believe there is an inclination to sin, but there is a possibility not to without being taught, thus innate morality. And because absolutes are far more important in the Calvinist spectrum, believing in innate morality seemingly compromises Calvinist absolutes.

   I hope that makes sense. What do you think?

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   1. 

      John Anthony Dunne

      December 31, 2013

      I think I’ll need you to unpack this further. I’m not sure how absolutes are relevant here. My point is simply that morality is not innate, not that there aren’t absolute morals. For me, revelation is where one learns what the moral code of the lawgiver is. I think it is empirically the case that humans are not born with a sense of right and wrong but are selfish and self-centered (you don’t have to be a Calvinist to agree with that, but I would add that the biblical portrait of humanity corroborates the human experience).

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      1. Aaron Argyropoulos

         December 31, 2013

         I was more concerned getting my point of absolutes across than addressing your point specifically. My point about absolutes has more to do with what you said about a child choosing selfishness first. Empirically, I would agree that that’s the case. However, my point is, depending on an individual’s theological disposition, can innate morality be summed up by questioning whether all children will absolutely turn to selfishness first? And I think if we can say that it happens absolutely all the time, then innate morality cannot be held on to.

         Let me finish by saying I agree with your rationalization of this topic. What I’m trying to do is give a philosophical approach, and perhaps I’m failing.

         Reply
2. Innate Morality: A Response to John Dunne | Cogito, Credo, Petam

   January 2, 2014

   […] Dunne has written at The Two Cities doubting innate morality, on the grounds of total depravity and the essential role of special revelation. He admits that he […]

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3. Ian Hodge

   January 2, 2014

   Hey John! Hope you’re doing well, although let me console you in advance for the clobbering the 49ers will face when (if) they meet the Seahawks!

   I found your perspective on innate morality to be interesting, as I hadn’t thought about criticizing the concept due to doctrines of total depravity and revelation in the past. However, I don’t think that either or these criticisms ultimately levels a very significant challenge to the notion of innate morality.

   Total depravity itself could explain what has happened to an innate morality. We may have all intuitively known the difference between right and wrong, but total depravity necessitates that we believe our intuitions, while often correct, are no longer fully reliable. Noetic effects of sin, right? Because our intuitions are no longer fully reliable, we must therefore seek knowledge to supplement and correct them, which we find in God’s revelation, particularly in His special revelation.

   If I remember right, Lewis argued for innate morality largely by remarking upon the fact that human beings the world over generally call the same things right and wrong. His explanation for this observation was innate morality, which seems perfectly permissible within a Christian worldview. On the other hand, as you observed you don’t have to teach a child to be selfish. The question is open both to Lewis and to you as to what is the best explanation of these phenomena. For example, it may be that human morality is largely the same the world over because the world operates in certain ways, and the thoughtful person understands something of the operation of the world and make moral judgments accordingly. As for the child, one might conclude that the reason for universal selfishness has to do with the corruption of our innate morality, i.e., total depravity.

   However you reason it out, Lewis’ point still stands. Whether our morality is innate or learned, we agree with the real moral law at least often enough to know we have broken it, leading to Lewis’ rather profound and even frightening description the terrible fix we are in.

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   1. 

      John Anthony Dunne

      January 3, 2014

      Hey Ian,

      Thanks for your comment. Yes Lewis’ argument for the ubiquity of certain moral norms definitely influenced me for a long time but to be perfectly honest I think that assessment ignores the role of culture’s influence on the one hand and ignores the fact that some cultures that have less or no contact with the wider world don’t always have the same sense of right and wrong. If a child was raised by wolves—to use an extreme example—what morals will that child have? If the answer is none, then of course the idea of innate morality completely falls by the wayside. I think we cannot ignore the cultural shape of morality. We should be grateful that Western culture is influenced by Judeo-Christian morality and so that affects how people in the West are raised. But the most important point to make is that the ultimate guide for morality is not my innate sense of right and wrong, but the moral code of the moral lawgiver.

      And we’ll see about those Seahawks. Go 9ers!

      Reply
      1. Ian Hodge

         January 3, 2014

         Hey John. The bottom line, of course, is that we agree that God’s revealed word is the primary way through which we know what is right or wrong. What I was trying to say in my prior comment was that I don’t think it will do to reject innate morality on the basis of total depravity and revelation. As a matter of fact, the person who believes that we have an innate morality will retreat to these doctrines in order to defend their position. They might say that the reason different cultures have differing moralities (to whatever degree) is because our moral intuitions have been corrupted by the fall. As a result, we require special revelation from God as part of the process of redemption.

         A quick note on Lewis – Lewis himself addresses the criticism (re: different cultures, not cultural influence however) that you raise. He mentions in Mere Christianity that he believes the differences between moral systems emerging from different cultures is more apparent than real. I think that, generally speaking, he is right.

         Now as to the child raised by wolves: I think that this example can’t do what you suggest it does. I think the problem is that it makes the assumption that immoral behavior from this person would be evidence that they didn’t have innate morality, when it may simply be evidence that whatever innate morality they had was so badly damaged by their circumstances that it is largely worthless. This seems a Biblical conclusion, as I believe we can reasonably assume that God intended human children to be raised by a human family, including taught right and wrong by a human family.

         Your point about cultural influences on morality is well taken. However, we still have to ask both how a culture first made moral judgments (where did they come from?), and also why people within a culture both agree and disagree with those moral judgments (why do they evolve?), once again opening the door to innate morality, though not proving it.

         Finally, I would argue that human conscience (innate morality, in a sense) is implied by statements like Romans 1:18-20. As human beings are part of the creation, and as we also have the image of God, it seems reasonable to assume that even within ourselves we have a testimony to God’s eternal power and divine nature, among which we might include God’s holiness, particularly in light of the statements regarding human wickedness and man’s lack of excuse.

         Thanks for letting me post, I enjoy the conversation and appreciate you reading my wordy replies!

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         1. 

            John Anthony Dunne

            January 9, 2014

            Hey Ian, thanks again for your second response. I hadn’t noticed it. I’m not sure that we’ll get past this point because I’m still not convinced that moral ubiquity equates to innate morality. I think we’re at an impasse, but I respect you taking the time to write and articulate your position. It gives me more to think about as I reflect on this issue further. Thanks for reading my post!

            Reply
4. Owen Edwards

   January 28, 2014

   Hey John.

   I think it too far a step to go to say that – biblically – the non-regenerate person has no access to moral instinct; Romans 7 strongly militates against that, in terms of proof texting, but more generally it seems unsatisfactory to me that our imago dei is entirely obliterated in ANY respect by sin; if we are to be glorious ruins, there must be some stones left.

   So I’d propose that yes, we know what we ought to do, albeit in a dim and fractured way; we are simply unable, outside of the scope of common grace, to do as we ought.

   Owen

   Owen

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   1. 

      John Anthony Dunne

      January 28, 2014

      Hey Owen,

      Thanks for reading my post and for taking the time to reply. Let me say up front that I disagree with your take on Romans 7 and with the way that you’re using the Imago Dei in this context.

      As for Romans 7, I hold the unregenerate view (as presumably you do), but of course the main point is that the EGO is “Israel in Adam” struggling to fulfill the law without the aid of the Holy Spirit. So yes indeed, not a regenerate person. However, this doesn’t quite relate to our discussion because knowledge of the law is assumed. I had nothing to say about whether the unregenerate can learn God’s laws or even “delight” in them. My point was that we don’t “innately” know any of that. So actually this text shows the priority of revelation—”I wouldn’t have known what it meant to covet unless the law told me!”—and proves my point.

      Secondly, the Imago Dei is, in my opinion, both a corporate and a functional idea. It is humanity as such that is the imago dei, and it refers to their relation to the world as the vice-regents of God (fill, rule, and subdue the earth). It is a regal and kingly idea and ANE contextual evidence makes this clear. Thus, I find no reason to think that morality, let alone innate morality, has anything to do with this.

      Anyways, I hope that clarifies things.

      Reply
      1. Owen Edwards

         January 30, 2014

         Hi John – thanks for the thoughtful response.

         Though your points are compellingly presented, I’m not convinced, for a few reasons.

         One, as to Romans 7 – I entirely grant your point about the chapter’s focus on the law. I would say, however, that for the law to be able to show Paul the sin he was committing (of which he was in part ignorant, re verses 7-12 etc), he must have had the capability of knowing good from evil; the skill was rotted perhaps, but the faculty was present. (That is, unless we take the Law to be able to grant to even the non-regenerate adherent the supernatural ability to comprehend the distinction of categories)

         Of course, if sin lay dead without the Law in toto, no Gentile could have been condemned prior to Christ. But Paul plainly thought that at the level of the reason the Gentile might well know God – see Romans 1 or the sarcastic polemic at the Areopagus [take that as Luke’s reflection or remembrance of Paul’s theology, if you’re of that inclination; it certainly proves the existence of such an attitude in the NT either way]. I would place the failure to adhere to that (partially corrupt) reason at the level of the corrupt will. I don’t see space in Paul’s argument(s) to posit a distinction between a reasonable knowledge of God and a moral knowledge of God; why would the evidence of the heavens and earth be useful as knowledge if there was no equivalent moral faculty to act upon the knowledge? I take them in Paul’s point to be one and the same. (Obviously, I’m not suggesting even at the level of reason humanity has a perfect innate sense of good and evil – we’re still talking depraved beyond use.)

         But let’s go further back in our Biblical anthropology. What do the First Family get booted for? There’s a tree offering the fruit of the knowledge of good and evil; presumably this equates to something like the type of knowledge God and the Divine Council have; so certainly aetiologically post-Eden man’s pretence to be God has granted him some sort of learned sense of good and evil prior to the Law (it’s not taken back by God, after all).

         However, we can go even further back; there was certainly a sort of pre-Fall innate sense of whether it was proper or not to obey a command (perhaps simply as part of ‘pre-Babel’ linguistic structure), because otherwise there could be no meaningful way for Adam and Eve to respond to God’s command not to eat. Now, if they possessed that faculty before the Fall, did they lose it entirely afterwards? Well, though they began to die, they did not entirely cease to live – human beings since have lived. So the greatest curse of the Fall did not entirely strip them of the “aspect” of them affected. Why ought we to suppose that their ability to sense the properness or otherwise of something would be stripped away? Of course it was crippled; outside of direct relationship with God it would be largely useless, beyond of dimly comprehending God’s works in nature; but it would still be present.

         That actually stands even if we don’t read the Imago Dei into the matter – the argument can be made at simply the observable facts of the Fall story, alongside Paul’s claims about Gentile guilt. I’d extend it to the Imago Dei, though, because your counter-argument is a pretty big claim – is the ONLY thing affecting our theology of the Imago Dei ANE parallels to the Genesis story of a king sending out his representatives? At the VERY least, I hear there was this one guy who was eikon of the invisible God and all that, and (“)Paul(“) certainly doesn’t seem to just have Christ’s commission from the Father in mind. Though I definitely think the Imago is at one level corporate (indeed, properly speaking I’d suggest it’s even marital), I feel entirely comfortable with the idea it pertains to personal characteristics about humanity that distinguish us from other animals – beyond simply the vice-regal commission.

         (Claus Westermann also raises very cogent objections to a strictly “Royal” interpretation of the text itself, but I’m trying to stick here to a canonical view – given we’re looking for the final result of our Scriptural theology, not any one text’s view.)

         God bless

         Owen

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